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A stewardship Cost perspective on Nonprofit governance And Delegation 
Relationships – the case of Social Franchising 
ABSTRACT 
We explore how nonprofits can effectively govern delegation relationships. We 
extend stewardship theory by conceptualizing stewardship costs; costs in delegation 
relationships based on stewardship behavior. As stewards are theorized as other-
regarding, self-actualizing and intrinsically motivated, so far, literature almost 
exclusively points to the positive performance potential of stewardship behavior. 
Addressing this shortcoming, we develop propositions showing how stewardship 
selection costs rooted in the psychological characteristics of stewardship behavior and 
stewardship management costs rooted in situational factors of stewardship behavior 
occur during relationship formation and maintenance and how they counteract the 
potential to increase performance. We identify and systematize opportunity costs of 
delayed growth, limited growth potential and lost standardization gains, as well as 
increased selection and management costs. To demonstrate the theoretical potential and 
empirical relevance of our framework, we illustrate our arguments by referring to social 
franchising, a scaling strategy considered relevant for nonprofits as well as social 
enterprises.  	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Stewardship theory, social franchising, delegation relationships, scaling strategy, social 
enterprise 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this paper we explore how nonprofits can effectively govern delegation 
relationships. By delegation relationships, we mean the interactions between an actor that 
hands out a task - the principal - and the recipient of the task - the agent or steward. 
Delegation relationships are ubiquitous in both for-profit and nonprofit contexts and can 
be found in various stakeholder relationships such as between owners/boards and 
managers (e.g., Caers et al., 2006; Hazelton, 2012; Kreutzer, 2009; Van Puyvelde et al. , 
2011), managers and employees or volunteers (Caers et al., 2006; Van Puyvelde et al., 
2011), or franchisor and franchisees (Beckmann & Zeyen, 2014; Combs, Ketchen, & 
Short, 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). Traditionally, research on the governance of 
delegation relationships has been concerned with minimizing the costs arising from 
opportunistic behavior and goal conflict. Theories that propose control and financial 
incentives to govern delegation relationships, such as agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
still dominate the for-profit governance literature today. Moreover, they are widely used 
in nonprofit and social enterprise governance literature (e.g., Beckmann & Zeyen, 2014; 
Kistruck, Webb, Sutter, & Ireland, 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2006, 2007).  
In contrast, theories that characterize delegation relationships as mutually 
consensual relationships between self-actualizing and collective-serving individuals, such 
as stewardship theory (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1989, 1991; 
Hernandez, 2012), have began to attract academic interest, mainly in contexts where 
actors are less likely to exhibit opportunistic behavior such as in nonprofits (e.g., Caers et 
al., 2006; Hazelton, 2012; Kreutzer, 2009; Van Puyvelde et al., 2011) or family-owned 
firms (e.g., Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Greenwood, 
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2003; Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2007). 
However, while the relevance of stewardship theory to explain delegation relationship 
governance is now acknowledged, most studies paint a very positive picture of 
stewardship relationships based on an alleged ethical superiority of stewardship behavior 
(e.g., Block, 2013; McCuddy, Pinar, Zeliha, & Bahar, 2011). Scholars thus emphasize 
the stewardship-relationship potential to increase performance (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & 
Litz, 2004; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 2010; Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2009; Lee & O’Neill, 2003) and neglect the idea that they can also incur costs. Rarely, 
studies have pointed towards potential problems of stewardship behavior such as 
groupthink, faulty attribution of success, rigidity, and escalating commitment (for an 
exception see Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  
Thus, the current academic debate about how to effectively govern delegation 
relationships is stuck between either focusing on minimizing costs in agency 
relationships or increasing performance in stewardship relationships. With this paper we 
aim to move beyond the current state of debate by arguing that, while stewardship 
relationships do hold the potential for increased performance, they also incur costs 
significantly limiting performance potential. In this view, costs in delegation relationship 
do not only result from actors’ opportunistic behavior or occur because of goal 
misalignment. Instead, they can also result from the psychological and situational 
characteristics underlying stewardship relationships. Thus, they may occur in 
relationships between self-actualizing and collective-serving individuals and in situations 
of goal congruence. Understanding costs in stewardship relationships helps to enhance 
nonprofit managers’ skills so they can exploit the benefits of stewardship relationships. 
while minimizing the costs of these relationships. The goal is to improve their 
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performance potential and to prevent their failure. Our main contribution then is an 
extension of stewardship theory by conceptualizing stewardship-specific costs in these 
relationships. We term those costs stewardship costs.  
We develop our argument as follows. First, we review the existing literature on 
stewardship theory and pinpoint two main shortcomings. Second, we develop 
propositions to conceptualize different types of stewardship costs, showing how (ex-ante) 
selection costs can result from the psychological factors and (ex-post) management costs 
can result from the situational factors of stewardship relationships, counteracting the 
potential to improve performance. To demonstrate the theoretical potential and empirical 
relevance of our conceptualization of stewardship costs, we illustrate our arguments by 
referring to social franchising, a scaling strategy considered potent for nonprofit 
organizations and social enterprises (Beckmann & Zeyen, 2014; Dees, Anderson, & Wei-
Skillern, 2004). Finally, we discuss implications of our theoretical framework and point 
to potential future research avenues.  
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EXISTING LITERATURE ON STEWARDSHIP THEORY  
This section will provide an overview of the current state of research on 
stewardship theory. In particular, we address the dominant arguments that stewardship 
relationships lead to superior performance and point to two shortcomings of the current 
research.  
Stewardship Theory – An Introduction 
Stewardship theory conceptualizes delegation relationships as consensual, i.e., the 
goals of both parties are a priori aligned. In order to explain this goal alignment, 
stewardship theory draws its elements from psychology and sociology (Schoorman, 
Wilson, Davis, Hundley, & Bagnoli, 2012). According to the psychological 
characteristics of stewardship theory, stewards are intrinsically-motivated, identify with 
the other party’s goals and the organization they belong to, and follow a desire to self-
actualize (Davis et al., 1997). Moreover, stewards tie their own utility function to that of 
others (Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2007), a behavior that is 
called other-regarding (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2007).  
A second set of characteristics draws on sociology to identify situational factors 
essential to enable stewardship behavior including a greater response to involvement-
oriented management, their collectivistic nature, and the preference for low power 
distance (Davis et al., 1997). Management in stewardship relationships is involvement 
oriented instead of control oriented and is characterized by participation, shared 
leadership practices, collaborative communication, empowerment, and trust (Hernandez, 
2012; Meek, Davis-Sramek, Baucus, & Germain, 2011). As stewards are conceptualized 
as collective-serving and other-regarding (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 2012), a 
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collectivistic culture that emphasizes organizational membership and harmony among 
members is more favorable for the development of stewardship relationships than an 
individualistic culture (Hofstede, 1980). Due to the collectivistic sociology and the 
motivational aspects, stewardship relationships are facilitated by a low power distance 
culture, which usually favors decentralized organization (Davis et al., 1997; Hernandez, 
2012). 
Current Research on Stewardship Theory and its Limitations 
Stewardship theory has been applied to different phenomena such as employee 
supervision (Caers et al., 2006), decision-making (Matherne, Ring, & McKee, 2011), 
team work (Cuevas-Rodríguez et al., 2012), creativity (Kuppelwieser, 2011) and in 
different contexts such as for profits (e.g., family firms) (Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 
2009; Miller, Le Breton-Miller, & Scholnick, 2007) and nonprofits (Caers et al., 2006; 
Hazelton, 2012; Kreutzer, 2009; Van Puyvelde et al., 2011). 
Reviewing the body of literature going beyond the nonprofit context, we 
identified two major shortcomings: First, - and the major issue this study aims to 
contribute to - existing literature promotes an overly optimistic perspective on the 
performance of stewardship relationships, neglecting potential problems and costs. 
Building on Davis et al. (1997)’s seminal theorization of stewardship relationships’ 
“performance maximization”, one of the key arguments of stewardship scholars is that 
stewardship relationships lead to superior performance (Cuevas-Rodríguez, Gomez-
Mejia, & Wiseman, 2012; Davis et al., 1997; Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; 
Matherne, Ring, & McKee, 2011; Miller et al., 2007; Toivonen & Toivonen, 2014; 
Zahra, Hayton, Neubaum, Dibrell, & Craig, 2008). While some scholars focus on 
stewardship’s alleged normative ethical superiority stressing the performance enhancing 
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nature of “serving others” (e.g., Block, 2013), we engage with the behavioral stewardship 
literature (Davis et al., 1997).  
Focusing on psychological characteristics of stewards, for instance, Taylor 
(2012) argues that stewardship relationships stem from the pro-organizational behavior 
of steward leaders, whereby they value and promote skill development in their followers 
more than their non-steward counterparts. Due to this active development of skills and 
capabilities of employees, the overall human capital of an organization increases thereby 
increasing its performance. Furthermore, studies indicate that individuals who identify 
with a specific group – e.g., the organization – tend to make more beneficial decisions on 
behalf of that group (Matherne et al., 2011). Based on the link between the stewards’ and 
the group’s utility function stewards aim at increasing welfare for all (Matherne et al., 
2011). Furthermore, Vallejo (2008) found that identification and involvement are 
positively linked with survival of for-profits while identification is also positively linked 
with profitability.  
In comparison to the psychological factors, the situational factors of stewardship 
theory received much less attention. For example, Toivonen and Toivonen (2014) 
identified situations of trust loss in which stewardship behavior ceased, leading to lower 
performance. Waters and colleagues (2013) argue that stewardship orientation leads to a 
more balanced perception of power between employees and employers, thus increasing 
employee’s performance. Furthermore, employees under stewardship management are 
found to be more creative (Kuppelwieser, 2011) and work better in teams (Cuevas-
Rodríguez et al., 2012). However, despite the general notion that stewardship 
relationships increase performance, existing evidence is far from conclusive, leading to 
the observation of the second shortcoming. 
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As second limitation, the literature investigating stewardship framework is 
conceptually ambiguous and empirically fragmented. Overall, most studies on 
stewardship behavior did not distinguish conceptually between the psychological and 
situational variables but rather address stewardship as a holistic construct. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that they address all variables and it often remains unclear 
what they mean by stewardship behavior. Moreover, most studies focus on the 
delegator’s perspective.  
There is only a limited number of empirical studies that investigate stewardship 
relationships. These studies vary greatly in their operationalization of key variables. For 
instance, while some authors use customer orientation as a proxy for stewardship 
orientation (Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Segaro, Larimo, & Jones, 2014), others 
point to the ill-fit of this operationalization (Caers et al., 2009; Kuppelwieser, 2011), 
making the comparison of results difficult. Together with the conceptual ambiguity, the 
fragmentation of empirical studies makes it difficult to judge the (performance) effect of 
stewardship behavior.  
We argue that stewardship relationships - like all transactions (Arrow, 1969) - 
incur costs. For example, Sundaramurthy and Lewis (2003) suggest that stewardship 
behavior can lead to problems like groupthink, faulty attribution of success, rigidity, and 
escalating commitment eventually leading to failure. Neglecting a better understanding 
of costs in stewardship relationships impedes our ability to improve their performance 
potential and to prevent their failure. Thus, the contribution of this paper is to help 
closing this gap by conceptualizing costs in delegation relationships that are not based on 
agency but on stewardship behavior and demonstrate their empirical relevance through 
illustrative examples.
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STEWARDSHIP COSTS IN SOCIAL FRANCHISING DELEGATION 
RELATIONSHIPS 
This section conceptualizes stewardship costs based on the psychological and 
situational factors of stewardship theory introduced in the seminal paper by Davis and 
colleagues (1997). The aim of this paper is not to provide a comprehensive list of all 
conceivable stewardship costs, but to introduce the idea that stewardship relationships do 
incur costs and to develop propositions outlining costs that are most plausible 
theoretically and empirically.  
Stewardship relationships in social franchising  
To demonstrate the potential of our conceptualization of stewardship costs in this 
section we apply it to the phenomenon of social franchising. Franchising occurs when 
one organization (the franchisor) sells “the right to market goods or services under its 
brand name and using its business practices to a second firm” (Combs, Michael, & 
Castrogiovanni, 2004, p. 907) or an individual (the franchisee), while social franchising 
transfers this concept to nonprofits and social enterprises (Sivakumar & Schoormans, 
2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). Social franchising is a suitable context for studying 
stewardship relationships. Based on the characteristics and success of commercial 
franchising as a means of scaling and due to its promise of broad social mission diffusion 
at limited cost (e.g., Dees et al., 2004), the popularity of social franchising in both 
practice and research has been growing (Beckmann & Zeyen, 2014; Kistruck, Webb, 
Sutter, & Ireland, 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2006, 2007). A prominent example of a social 
enterprise franchises from the literature is Aspire. The UK-based nonprofit social 
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franchise helped homeless people by providing them with employment and housing 
(Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). While Aspire failed, successful examples exist. These include 
Dialogue Social Enterprise (DSE), a German-based social franchise that employs blind 
people to work as guides in their dark exhibitions and the Danish nonprofit organization 
Specialisterne that employs people with autism and utilizes their special abilities to offer 
services to IT companies (Dialogue in the Dark India, 2013; Heinecke & Sonne, 2012; 
Specialisterne, 2013a).  
Most importantly, while stewardship theory has been applied to delegation 
relationships within organizations it has not been applied to franchising and most 
surprisingly not to social franchising despite the fact that members of social enterprises 
and nonprofits are often portrayed as strongly self-actualizing, deliberately willing to 
accept low financial compensation while pursuing a social mission (Brooks, 2008; 
Heinecke & Mayer, 2012; Weerawardena & Mort, 2006). So far, analogous to 
commercial franchising, social franchising has been studied through the lens of agency 
theory (Beckmann & Zeyen, 2014; Kistruck et al., 2011; Tracey & Jarvis, 2006, 2007), 
suggesting a clear gap in the literature. 
Stewardship Costs based on Psychological Factors 
Existing research argues that the superior performance of mutual stewardship 
relationship relies on the actors’ psychological stewardship characteristics such as 
intrinsic motivation, strong identification with the delegator, and responsiveness to the 
use of personal power (e.g. Chrisman, Chua, & Litz, 2004; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004; 
Davis et al., 2010; Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Lee & O’Neill, 2003). An important 
assumption of stewardship theory in this context is that stewardship behavior of delegates 
is usually enacted with the delegator they identify with (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). We 
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pinpoint two effects through which those psychological characteristics can create costs in 
delegation relationships, i.e., an increased relevance of selection and increased selection 
cost intensity. 
First, it is essential to identify and select stewards to establish a stewardship 
relationship. However, psychological characteristics and motivations are usually hidden 
and can easily be obscured by actors due to information asymmetry (Connelly, Certo, 
Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989). To alleviate information asymmetry, agency 
theorists can resort to ex-ante signaling, screening and contract design as well as to ex-
post goal alignment mechanisms such as financial ownership incentives and control 
mechanisms like reporting and monitoring (Conelly et al., 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Nyberg, Fulmer, Gerhart, & Carpenter, 2010; Van Puyvelde et al., 2011). However, ex-
post goal alignment is difficult in stewardship relationships due to stewards’ non-
responsiveness to financial rewards as well as ex-post monitoring and control 
mechanisms (Davis et al., 1997). While it may be possible to align goals ex-post through, 
e.g. intensive involvement or joint mission-building, the costs are likely to be 
prohibitively high. Thus, it is crucial to determine the “fit” between delegator and 
delegate ex-ante (Caers et al., 2009), increasing the importance of the selection process 
and associated selection costs.  
Secondly, there is a rich literature on the signaling of traditional characteristics 
such as quality, skill and education (Clarkin & Swavely, 2006; Jambulingam, Joseph, & 
Nevin, 1999) helping actors to screen partners for an agency relationship. In stewardship 
relationships, however, actors need to screen beyond traditional characteristics to select 
partners based on their intentions and the potential to establish a trust relationship. 
Literature on signaling behavioral intentions and psychological characteristics is scarce 
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(Connelly et al., 2011) with recent research showing that intuitive and easy-to-use 
mechanisms such as selecting partners according to similarity with oneself are ineffective 
(Caers et al., 2009). Furthermore, different intrinsic motivations such as mission-
orientation and client-orientation have to be distinguished, as ex-post conflicts can arise 
with delegates who are too client-oriented rather than mission-oriented (Caers et al., 
2009). Thus, in comparison to establishing agency relationships, selecting partners for a 
stewardship relationship is more costly (Caers et al., 2006; Steinberg, 1990), as there are 
fewer objective measurement methods to uncover motivation and establishing trust takes 
time. This reasoning can also help to explain why stewardship relationships are common 
in family firms, where actors have prior ties that reduce the difficulty of identifying an 
actor’s true intentions and establishing trust (Miller et al., 2007), thus reducing 
stewardship selection costs. 
Thus, stewardship costs based on psychological factors materialize as selection 
costs in the form of resource and time investment that happens prior to relationship 
formalization. Importantly, stewardship selection costs occur in addition to selection 
costs previously identified in the literature.  
 
Proposition 1a: The more important psychological stewardship characteristics 
are as partner selection criteria, the higher both delegator’s and delegate’s 
selection costs in the form of resource and time investment. 
 
From the delegator’s perspective and as a longer-term consequence, the increased 
selection cost and time will likely lead to slower organizational growth and thus the 
number of relationships formalized will be lower in a given timeframe. Therefore, 
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stewardship costs based on psychological factors further materialize as opportunity costs 
of delayed organizational growth, which become visible long term and are specifically 
detrimental to organizations relying on growth or economies of scale.  
For example, Andreas Heinecke, founder of DSE, characterizes himself as “the 
worst salesman” because he reveals the most unpleasant facts in the very first meetings 
with potential franchisees to ensure he only selects franchisees that are truly motivated 
by the mission and who understand that financial returns are limited (Volery & Hackl, 
2010). It usually takes an average of 2 years from the first contact until the contract is 
signed at DSE (Heinecke & Sonne, 2012). Established as a franchise in 1995 (INSEAD, 
2010), in 2015 DSE operates 25 permanent exhibitions worldwide (Dialogue Social 
Enterprises, 2015). While the two locations in Germany are company-owned, the 
remaining 23 outlets are franchised (Dialogue Social Enterprises, 2015). Thus, DSE has 
grown by approximately one outlet per year, while Specialisterne is growing at an even 
slower rate despite following an active growth strategy (Specialisterne, 2013b) and 
enjoying global media coverage. Thus, both cases are at the bottom end of absolute 
franchise growth rate numbers (Taylor & Campbell, 2015) and show very low and 
declining relative growth rates when new outlets are calculated as percentage of the 
number of existing outlets (Elgin, 2015). We thus formulate the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1b: The more important psychological stewardship characteristics 
are as partner selection criteria, the higher the opportunity costs of delayed 
organizational growth. 
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Second, existing stewardship literature has mainly argued that the strong 
identification between delegator and delegate decreases the risk of opportunistic behavior 
in the relationship (Le-Breton-Miller & Miller, 2009; Miller et al., 2007). However, 
existing literature on organizational identification shows that strong identification can 
have dysfunctional effects when overemphasized (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007). “Over-
identification” is a psychological dysfunction leading to selective information processing 
and perception (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007) and can lead to non-consideration of traditional 
selection criteria (Katz & Genevay, 2002), such as the delegates’ capability to perform 
the task or the viability of the delegator’s business. Thus, over-identification between 
delegator and delegate during selection can crowd out the ability to accurately assess the 
partner’s quality characteristics.  
Therefore, stewardship costs based on psychological over-identification can 
materialize as costs of dysfunctional partner selection. While the negative performance 
effects of selecting a wrong partner despite everyone’s honest efforts may be difficult to 
distinguish from the negative effects of adverse selection due to opportunism, they are 
conceptually different (Hendry, 2002). Whereas the performance of an opportunistic but 
capable delegate can be manipulated with appropriate incentives ex-post (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the performance of an honest but incapable delegate is 
more difficult to manipulate ex-post.  
For example, one aspect contributing to the failure of Aspire was the fact that the 
charismatic personality of one of the founders obscured flaws in the business model and 
led investors and franchisees to invest despite apparent issues (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). 
The franchisor dysfunctionally selected mainly nonprofits as franchisees, emphasizing 
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their ability to deal with homeless people, while neglecting their capabilities to run a 
business (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). Overall, we propose: 
 
Proposition 2: The stronger the identification between delegator and delegate, 
the higher the likelihood of costs of dysfunctional partner selection. 
 
Stewardship Costs based on Situational Factors 
Existing conceptual research has further argued that the superior performance of 
mutual stewardship relationship relies on the relationship’s situational stewardship 
characteristics such as involvement orientation, collectivism, and low power distance 
(Davis et al., 1997). We identify three ways in which those situational factors can create 
costs. While stewardship costs based on psychological factors mainly result from the 
efforts and inefficiencies of establishing a mutual stewardship relationship during 
selection, stewardship costs based on situational factors arise predominantly due to 
efforts and inefficiencies of maintaining the previously established mutual stewardship 
relationship during relationship management.  
First, existing stewardship research highlighted that involvement orientation can 
increase decision-making quality, which leads to an increase in a stewardship 
relationship’s performance potential (Davis et al., 1997). Involvement orientation is 
characterized by participation and shared leadership practices (Hernandez, 2012; Meek et 
al., 2011), which rely on personalized relationship maintenance through frequent 
individual interactions, reciprocal feedback, and informal communication (Bleeke & 
Ernst, 1993; Hernandez, 2012; Meek, Davis-Sramek et al., 2011). However, practices of 
participation and shared leadership in involvement orientation will incur ex-post 
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stewardship management costs of slow and complex decision-making and coordination 
as multiple delegates need to be involved. 
 
Proposition 3a: The more the management philosophy relies on involvement 
orientation, the higher the delegator’s management costs of decision-making and 
coordination. 
 
Furthermore, these issues will likely increase with the growth of the organization 
as the involvement of more actors further complicates and slows down decision-making 
and coordination. Thus, growing organizations will likely experience a threshold size 
beyond which involvement orientation costs will outweigh its benefits. As a 
consequence, involvement orientation limits an organization’s growth potential as larger 
organizations will need to - at least partly - revert to control orientation with an 
increasing number and complexity of decision-making processes (Morck & Yeung, 
2003). The more an organization’s management philosophy involves control orientation, 
however, the more it will incorporate elements of agency rather than stewardship 
relationships (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Thus, stewardship costs based on involvement 
orientation further materialize as opportunity costs of limited organizational growth.  
In both DSE and Specialisterne, the founder is the main supporter for franchisees 
and thus devotes a lot of time and resources in meetings, on the phone, or travelling to 
the outlets to nurture relationships with the franchisees (Heinecke & Sonne, 2012; Volery 
& Hackl, 2010). However, a franchisor can only manage a limited number of close 
personal contacts, which ultimately limits the total number of franchisees. As a rule of 
thumb there should be at least one full-time support person for each 15 to 20 new 
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franchisees (Elgin, 2015). Supporting this rule Heinecke states that he reached his 
capacity of relationship maintenance. Thus, further growth risks compromising the 
existing personalized and involvement-oriented management philosophy through the 
need to introduce levels of hierarchy between franchisor and franchisees and more 
formalization in their interaction (INSEAD, 2010). Limited growth, however, limits 
DSE’s social impact. We thus conjecture: 
 
Proposition 3b: The more the management philosophy relies on involvement 
orientation, the higher opportunity costs of a limited organizational growth 
potential. 
Second, existing research has highlighted the performance potential of 
organizations relying on collectivist cultures (Davis et al., 1997). However, collectivism 
can spur goal conflict between parties when delegator and delegate prioritize different 
stakeholder groups or have a different understanding of how to serve them based on 
nonprofits’ goal of attaining often-contradicting social and commercial objectives 
(Weerawardena & Mort, 2006). For instance, conflicts will arise in the frequent scenario 
of the delegator being more mission-oriented while the delegate is being more client-
oriented (Caers et al., 2009). While delegators are concerned with the strategic long-term 
mission of the entire organization, delegates work more closely with and for their local 
clients (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007). Thus, as soon as trade-offs between client-orientation 
and mission-orientation emerge, the likelihood of a collectivism dilemma increases. In 
these situations, delegates are torn between the desires to serve both the client and 
delegator. This dilemma is likely to be more pronounced in delegation relationship where 
delegates enjoy high levels of autonomy, work in geographically distant locations from 
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the delegators’ headquarters, or operate within a complex network of stakeholder 
relationships (Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato, & Amezcua, 2011; Van Puyvelde et al., 
2011). 
For example, with due care, the conflicts at and the eventual demise of the social 
franchise Aspire as reported by Tracey and Jarvis (2007) could be interpreted as 
stewardship costs due to goal conflict based on collectivism. They quote: “The catalog 
business’ struggle for survival meant that the needs of employees became less significant 
as the Aspire Group’s priorities shifted to building competitive position and reducing 
overheads. But the priority for the franchisees remained the employment and support of 
homeless people.” (Tracey & Jarvis, 2007, p. 679). Thus, collectivism can promote more 
conflict costs than individualism as it requires negotiations and mutuality, resulting in 
stewardship management costs of conflict resolution, such as negotiation and conciliation 
efforts. Importantly, those conflicts differ conceptually from moral hazard in agency 
theory whereby the delegate acts opportunistically and can be manipulated with financial 
incentives to align individualistic goals with those of the delegator (Eisenhardt, 1989). In 
a stewardship relationship both delegator and delegate act based on their collectivistic 
and other-regarding nature and thus cannot be manipulated with financial incentives 
(Davis et al., 1997). We formulate the following proposition.  
 
Proposition 4: With increasing divergence in stakeholder prioritization between 
delegate and delegator, a collectivistic orientation will lead to management costs 
of conflict resolution.  
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Third, low power distance has been shown to lead to higher autonomy and 
decision making authority of the delegate, increasing their performance in a stewardship 
relationship (Schoorman et al., 2012). While decentralized power enables self-control 
and self-management of the delegate, it will also likely exacerbate issues generated by 
the other situational variables such as coordination costs (due to involvement orientation) 
and a potential collectivist dilemma. Furthermore, in large organizations that rely on 
centralization and standardization low power distance can counteract these through high 
autonomy and individualism.  
In the context of nonprofits, low power distance increases the difficulty to 
standardize operations. However, standardization minimizes cost, increases scale 
economies, and facilitates benchmarking in quality control, which are all important 
performance factors in the social sector (Bradach, 2003). In the context of social 
franchising, standardization leads to image consistency, which is a key success factor of 
franchising (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998; Zachary, McKenny, Short, Davis, & Wu, 2011). 
Low power distance increases delegate autonomy, which, together with lacking ex-post 
goal alignment incentives, facilitates divergence from standard operating procedures. 
Furthermore, most social franchises are business format franchises (Heinecke & Mayer, 
2012) with less detailed contracts (Volery & Hackl, 2010). Therefore, critical knowledge 
is often tacit (Bradach, 2003), making it more difficult to find the “delicate balance 
between the large-scale economies derived from system standardization and small-scale 
economies derived from local market adaptation” (Kaufmann & Eroglu, 1998, p. 70). 
Thus, the lack of standardization increases costs, reduces benchmarking and the 
associated potential for improvement, learning and innovation.  
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For example, while Heinecke from DSE uses the term “Friendchising” supporting 
the notion of low power distance, he also describes himself as a “toothless tiger” in his 
role as franchisor stating that franchisees are often unwilling to report results, accept 
changes or even pay royalties (Heinecke, 2011). Despite multiple attempts, DSE did not 
succeed in persuading their delegates to follow a uniform corporate identity, resulting in 
a great variety of logos (while the name is translated into the respective language, font 
type, and color scheme vary for every outlet). While low power distance has ‘only’ hurt 
DSE’s performance, in the case of Aspire, delegates’ unwillingness to support the 
delegator’s attempts to improve the organization’s financial situation has contributed to 
its demise. Thus, stewardship costs based on low power distance materialize as 
opportunity costs of foregone gains from standardization and an amplification of existing 
stewardship management costs. Thus, we propose the following. 
Proposition 5: Low power distance between delegator and delegate will increase 
opportunity costs of foregone gains from standardization and other stewardship 
management costs. 
 
Systematization of Stewardship Costs  
Stewardship costs can be systematized along different dimensions. One way is to 
systematize costs based on their origin along the relationship formation process and to 
distinguish whether costs are created before (ex-ante) or after (ex-post) the relationship is 
formalized. This allows for a comparison with existing delegation relationship costs, 
such as agency costs. Although ex-ante stewardship selection costs are created during 
selection, some costs only become effective after selection such as opportunity costs of 
delayed growth or dysfunctional partner selection. Here, ex-ante stewardship costs are 
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mainly created by the psychological factors of stewardship theory. As the situational 
factors of stewardship theory determine how delegator and delegate interact with each 
other once they have entered a mutual stewardship relationship, we conceptualize ex-post 
stewardship costs as predominately based on the situational variables of involvement 
orientation, collectivism, and low power distance. Furthermore, we systematize 
stewardship costs based on the type of costs such as selection, opportunity, or 
management costs. Table 1 illustrates and systematizes the stewardship costs we 
identified. 
------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this paper we conceptualize costs in delegation relationships that are not based 
on agency but stewardship behavior, which we term stewardship costs. Stewardship costs 
have been neglected in the literature so far as researchers have emphasized its potential to 
increase performance, neglecting the notion that stewardship relationships can incur 
costs. Our conceptualization contributes to different streams of research. First, we extend 
stewardship theory. Second, by applying stewardship theory and our conceptualization to 
social franchising, we contribute to social franchising as well as nonrofit and social 
enterprise research.  
Implications for Stewardship Theory 
We contribute to stewardship theory by introducing the concept of stewardship 
costs that arise from the establishment and maintenance of mutual stewardship 
relationships. We conceptualize stewardship costs as grounded in the psychological and 
situational characteristics of stewardship relationships and develop propositions outlining 
costs that are most plausible theoretically. Our study highlights that all delegation 
relationships, be it agency or stewardship, incur costs that need to be understood and 
managed. Thus, we see our contribution as complementing existing work that combines 
agency and stewardship theories by suggesting that costs do always occur but that the 
type of cost - stewardship or agency – depends on a relationship’s location on the 
stewardship-agency axis (Caers et al., 2006). We show how stewardship costs are 
conceptually different from agency costs. While agency costs result from weak goal 
alignment due to opportunism, stewardship costs result from psychological and 
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situational factors at the core of stewardship relationships. These, in turn, lead to 
different recommendations for research and practice. The main intended contribution of 
this paper was to develop the idea of stewardship costs not benefits, which already have 
been elaborated in existing literature. Thus, when formulating our propositions we 
focused on the absolute cost effect not the net cost effect, which can be conceive as an 
inverted U-shaped curve given that stewardship behavior does have positive performance 
effects that may possibly be outweighed by stewardship costs. Future research could 
disentangle those effects. As the purpose of our study was not to introduce a 
comprehensive list of all stewardship costs, we encourage future research to identify 
more stewardship costs that may occur in different contexts.  
These implications have to be considered against the background of some 
inherent limitations. For example, as we apply stewardship theory, our framework is 
prone to the same limitations. It is questionable whether the psychological and situational 
factors of stewardship theory cover all aspects that explain when stewardship behavior 
likely prevails over agency behavior. Since this study focused on the conceptualization of 
stewardship costs, an integrative approach that identifies the interplay between agency 
and stewardship costs was beyond our scope. However, we call for more work in the 
tradition of Caers and colleagues (2006) and Van Puyvelde and colleagues (2011) that 
combines both perspectives on delegation relationships while not neglecting potential 
costs. This may also help research and practice by determining which situations call for 
management based on agency or stewardship behavior.  
Another important avenue for future research is the testing our propositions 
empirically and the operationalization of the stewardship constructs and costs. In 
particular, as stewardship costs such as dysfunctional partner selection may be difficult to 
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distinguish empirically from agency costs despite their conceptual differences. Existing 
research points to the importance for nonprofits to have more fine-grained selection 
mechanisms (Caers et al., 2009). For example, to measure identification, future research 
could draw on existing studies on organizational identification (e.g. Ashforth, Harrison, 
& Corley, 2008). Furthermore, we call for a more mainstream application of stewardship 
theory to both nonprofit and for-profit literatures.  
Implications for Nonprofit Research and Management  
The insights from our conceptualization are relevant to various issues addressed 
in the nonprofit literature, mainly selection and management of steward delegates such as 
employees or volunteers as well as organizational growth. For example, recent research 
suggests that many nonprofits focus on volunteer selection rather than retention and calls 
for a greater focus on volunteer retention to avoid high selection costs (Brudney & Meijs, 
2009). Others have pointed towards the issue of selecting too client-oriented instead or 
mission-oriented candidates (Caers et al., 2009). While our conceptualization offers a 
theoretical framework to make sense of these findings, we can identify opportunities for 
future research and implications for practice. We identified the selection of steward 
delegates as a main growth constraint and over-identification as major risk of selecting 
unsuitable delegates. Thus, the selection of delegates has to take place at the ‘sweet spot’ 
of relying on prior ties to reduce selection costs but not over-relying on them to avoid the 
risk of over-identification. Stewardship research in the context of family-owned firms 
(Chirico, Ireland, & Sirmon, 2011) suggests relying on family members or friends as 
delegates to reduce selection costs.  
Further research is needed to untangle those effects. Specifically, one potent path 
of research would be to understand how identification and personal power could be made 
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transferable, i.e. how to have multiple executives with whom staff members identify and 
whom they are willing to grant personal power. This research would further help to 
reduce the inherent instability of organizations built on stewardship management. Due to 
the reliance on individual perception of identification and motivation, the organization in 
turn depends on specific individuals. Thus, if those individuals leave the organization, 
the underlying functioning of that organization might shatter. Future research could help 
organizations to find mechanisms to avoid such organizational failures.  
Regarding delegate management, recent research suggests that volunteer 
management approaches in nonprofits are usually designed as ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
approaches (Gaskin, 2003; Rochester, 2007). Our conceptualization, however, suggests 
that relationships between delegate and delegator have to be maintained on a 
personalized level. Thus, the challenge for nonprofits is to ensure effective, personalized 
management while keeping its costs low. To overcome this problem, larger social 
franchises have implemented hierarchical structures with regional representatives who 
intermediate between delegator and local delegate, such as German nonprofit wellcome 
gGmbH (Wellcome, 2013). The reasoning behind this approach is to implement agency 
governance structures, without crowding out stewardship motivation (Beckmann & 
Zeyen, 2014). Such an approach might also help to overcome the conflict between 
volunteerism and managerialism often found in nonprofits (Kreutzer & Jager, 2011). 
However, more research is needed to understand how such approaches can work and 
whether there exists a location on the stewardship-agency axis where costs are minimized 
or whether costs just change from stewardship to agency or vice versa.  
Furthermore, important implications from our theoretical framework address the 
inherent issues of growth speed or limit of organizational size of nonprofits which can 
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cause significant problems for nonprofits for whom scale is imperative to create greater 
societal change (Uvin, Jain, & Brown, 2000). Opposing existing conceptualizations 
(Dees et al., 2004; Heinecke & Mayer, 2012), nonprofits may grow slower or more cost-
intensively via franchising, than, for example, via branching. While branching requires 
more financial resource investment (e.g. Heinecke & Mayer, 2012), franchising requires 
more resources to select franchisees ex-ante as they cannot be monitored as effectively as 
employees via ex-post behavioral control. We conclude that social franchises may grow 
faster when the identification process between franchisee and franchisor can be shortened 
such as through prior ties. However, focusing on delegates with prior ties limits the size 
of the organization to the number of family and friends each delegator has. Even if 
partner selection costs and time can be reduced, stewardship management confines the 
growth to the delegator’s capacity to maintain close relationships with delegates.  
In conclusion, we hope that our framework will help to both enhance nonprofit 
managers’ skills by creating an understanding of the costs involved when operating from 
a stewardship approach to delegation and to enrich the theoretical foundations and 
empirical findings of future research studying delegation relationships. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 One exception is the study by McCuddy, and colleagues (2011). However, the 
authors address the ethical theory of stewardship, which differs from stewardship 
delegation theory. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Systematization of stewardship costs 
 Stewardship 
Variables 
(Proposition) 
Origin of 
Stewardship 
Costs  
Type of 
Stewardship 
Costs 
Example 
So
ur
ce
 o
f S
te
w
ar
d-
sh
ip
 C
os
ts
 
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
l 
Intrinsic 
motivation, 
identification, 
and personal 
power 
(P1) 
Ex- ante Selection costs of 
resource and time 
investment (P1a) 
2 years from first 
contact until signed 
contract  
Opportunity costs 
of delayed growth 
(P1b) 
DSE’s and 
Specialisterne’s 
growth rate of max. 
one outlet per year   
Identification 
(P2) 
Ex-ante  Likely costs of 
dysfunctional 
partner selection  
Aspire: franchisors 
had little experience 
with the social 
enterprises, 
franchisees being 
nonprofits had little 
experience in 
business or social 
enterprise 
Si
tu
at
io
n
al
 
Involvement 
orientation 
Ex-post Management 
costs of 
DSE’s founder is 
managing all 
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(P3) coordination and 
decision-making 
(P3a) 
franchisees 
individually and has 
reached capacity. 
Opportunity costs 
of limited growth 
potential (P3b) 
Collectivism 
(P4) 
Ex-post Management 
costs of conflict 
resolution 
Aspire: Franchisor’s 
priorities shifted 
while franchisees 
remained 
collectivistic 
towards 
beneficiaries 
Low power 
distance 
(P5) 
Ex-post Opportunity costs 
of foregone gains 
from 
standardization 
DSE’s failed 
attempts of 
standardizing the 
brand 
Indirect costs 
through increase 
in other 
management 
costs 
DSE’s founder uses 
the term 
“friendchising” but 
describes himself as 
“toothless tiger” 
 
